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1. Peter Hall: A futurist historian 
 
Back in 1982, I thought I had seen what the city would look like in 2019. It was a dark 
place, with flickering neon signs, spinning spotlights, and flying police cars racing 
between skyscrapers. People were eating noodles bought from Chinese street markets in 
the rain, and everyone was keeping an eye on genetically-engineered androids from an 
off-planet colony. Some 24 years later, it turned out that apart from eating noodles and 
the rain, the future wasn’t going to be Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner.  Instead, we were 
told that the future was about blue sky, cycling, greeneries, recycling, and renewable 
energiesi. It was going to be about ‘smart, responsive simplicity’ according to Peter 
Head, Director of Arup, when he launched the Dongtan City project in Shanghai. That 
was 2006. Today, the project is on halt and even if it wasn’t, would Dongtan be a 
realistic model of urban future? If not, what would be?  One person who has tried 
tirelessly to find out is Sir Peter Hall whom I first met in 1996 and had the privilege of 
working with and enjoying his support ever since. 
 
Peter Hall is one of those rare scholars of planning history who have the ability to look 
into the past and see the future. One of his most celebrated books about planning 
history is ironically called Cities of Tomorrow.  It is true that the title of the book was 
inspired by Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities of Tomorrow but, there is more to it than a 
mere inspiration. The title and the text reflect Peter’s mastery of combining insight with 
foresight. As the review by the Times Higher Education Supplement put it: 
 
‘What is really important about this book is Hall’s capacity to tap into our current 
pre-occupations, and it is his understanding of the present which will make 
readers interested in his interpretations of the past’ (Hall, 1994, back cover, 
emphasis added). 
 
And, that is not all. It is also his perspective on the future which makes his interpretation 
of history a rewarding experience for the readers.  Peter is as much a futurist as an 
historian, and there is as much future thinking in his account of urban history as there is 
in his publications that carry the term ‘future’ in their title.  Despite this, in writing this 
chapter I duly followed the editors’ instruction and focused only on the latter. This by no 
means reduced the scope of the task or the workload because there are no fewer than 
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26 papers in that category. The first one was written in 1966 and published in 1972  on 
The Pattern of Cities to Come (Hall, 1972) and the latest – though not  necessarily the 
last- one was published in 2008 on Key Issues for Planning Futures and the Way Forward 
(Davoudi et al, 2008). The papers can be grouped into 2 broad categories: cities in the 
future and future of ‘the city’.  I elaborate on these in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter 
after a brief discussion of imagining urban futures in section 2. The final section (section 
5) outlines the emerging paradigm in futures thinking.  
         
Seeing the future from the past 
Reading through Peter’s papers, particularly the earlier publications, is an unusual time-
travel experience because the future is presented from the past.  What is portrayed as 
an unknown future at the time of writing becomes a known history at the time of 
reading. It is, therefore, tempting to map Peter’s predictions against today’s realities. 
One of my favourites is a 1971 article in which Peter describes a Post Office exhibit of a 
mock-up of a civil engineer at work in his office of the 1990s as follows:  
 
The engineer ‘sits in a luxurious office in his own country home. He 
communicates instantly with other professionals […], using a bewildering variety 
of devices: the video-phone (Skype), the data transmission link (Internet), the 
computer display with light pen (touch screen), the cordless telephone (iPhone). 
He eliminates commuting. The home has become the workplace.’ (Hall, 
1971:175, words in brackets are added)  
 
Apart from ‘eliminating commuting’, this example, like many others, demonstrates how 
farsighted some of Peter’s future visions are but, that is not really the point. The point is 
that it takes a great deal of courage and integrity to speculate about what the future city 
looks like and even more so to suggest what it should look like. Peter, like other great 
visionaries before him, has done both.  
 
3. Imagining urban futures  
 
 ‘The desire to peer into the future is a human trait as old as the Biblical prophets 
and the oracle at Delphi. And the desire to project urban futures is at least as old 
as Plato’s description of the ideal city-state in The Republic’ (Le Gates and Stout, 
2003: 467) 
 
However, both the pace of futurist activities and the perceptions of the future have 
changed over time. For the pre-industrial societies future was at the mercy of the Devine 
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forces and thus could only be known through Delphi’s prophecy. The Enlightenment was 
to change that by freeing the future from the constraints of divinity and nature and by 
making it subject to human domination. In its perceived clockwork universe, science was 
to replace God in determining the future. The antidote to future uncertainties and the 
insurance against its contingencies was prediction and planning (Luhmann, 1982).  
Armed with the science of the probable, futurist activities flourished after the industrial 
revolution. At the same time, the rapid urbanisation of the 19th century triggered a wave 
of urban visioning. Indeed, ‘the greatest period of visionary idealism in which physical 
designs for ideal cities were pronounced dates from approximately 1880 to 1940’ (Hall, 
1983:190). A period in which great utopias were born which had a more obsessive 
quality’ (ibid: 189) related to ‘a desired ideal state’ (ibid: 190) than their contemporary 
planning ideas. Among them those that became widely known and influential were: 
Ebenezer Howard’s garden city (Garden Cities of Tomorrow), Le Corbusier’s radiant city 
(La Ville radieuse), Frank Lloyd Wright’s suburban city (Broadacre City), and the Charter 
of Athens’ functional city.  
 
These physically-based and socially-oriented utopian visions were the first wave of the 
20th century urban futurism. We are now witnessing a second wave. Like their 
predecessors, the contemporary visionary idealism has been triggered by major societal 
changes of which two are particularly powerful. The first one is similar to what drove the 
first wave of urban utopias. It is the rapid pace of urbanisation and the challenge of 
metropolitan organisation. However, this time it is happening in the developing countries 
which are urbanising even faster than the industrial nations did at the heydays of their 
urban growth. It took London 130 years to reach a population of 8 Million. Mexico City 
did that in 30 years. At China’s current rate of construction, Rome can be built not in one 
day but certainly in two weeks. In took only a decade (1999-2010) for China to build the 
equivalent of Europe’s entire housing stock (The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 
2011). This unprecedented rate of urbanisation has been associated with the all too 
familiar social and environmental problems. A third of urban population in developing 
countries live in slums. Across the world, this amounts to over one billion people who 
have no access to: clear water, sanitation, infrastructure, health services, safety and 
security (The UN Global Report, 2009). They live in ‘cities of dreadful nights’ (Hall, 
1994:13) as did the urban poor in the 19th century cities of industrial countries which are 
at the centre of Peter Hall’s early writings on urban futures.    
 
The second driver of the current surge in visionary idealism is climate change which 
marks a major shift in the normative visions of urban future with the emphasis being 
less on social and more on environmental concerns.  Although environment played a part 
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in earlier utopias, it was largely limited to the concerns over the protection of the 
countryside from urban sprawl, or the merging of the best of the town with the best of 
the country, or the improvement of local amenities. De-carbonisation was not on the 
agenda of the early 20th century visionaries, neither was it on the agenda of the 
scientists. The only exception was an English steam engineer called Guy Callendar who 
was seen by the rest of the scientific community as an eccentric. Thus, his 1938 carbon 
dioxide theory of climate change remained in the intellectual oblivion for few decades 
(Davoudi, 2009). Today, no urban futurism is complete without a vision of the zero-
carbon cities. Some are pure fantasies such as the idea of a self-sufficient island 
(labelled Lilypad) floating on water to house climate change refugees of up to 50,000 
people and not only having zero emission, but also absorbing carbon dioxide by the 
greeneries planted all around itii. Others are more plausible experimentations with 
carbon-neutral cities such as Norman Foster’s Masdar city that is being built, somewhat 
ironically, in the oil-rich Abu Dhabi. It is designed to be powered by the sun, free of cars 
and skyscrapers, and complete with full recycling and personal rapid transit, the 
‘podcar’.    
 
These experiments signal a new conception of ‘the city’ as a giant laboratory. Every 
movement of the residents and every function of the city are monitored by intrusive 
remote sensing devices. Data is continuously collected, analysed and fed back to the 
drawing boards of the designers and engineers. It is the ‘Big Brother’ experiment at a 
large scale whose aim is to find out how people respond to de-carbonising urban 
engineering. Similar experiments are happening in other places such as Victorian Eco-
Innovation Lab in Australia and Songdo Eco-city in South Korea. Another growing trend 
which aims to tackle similar environmental problems yet with different solutions is the 
formation of Transition Towns. Contrary to the expert-driven, high-tech urban labs of 
carbon-neutral city, these are grass-root-driven, low-tech, communal settlements. If the 
urban labs look into tomorrow’s technologies for reducing the cities’ ecological footprints, 
Transition Towns look into yesterday’s practices for creating closed-cycle urban 
metabolism. Both treat the city as a bounded container and immune from wider spatial 
connections.       
 
The art of possible  
In an article on Utopian Thoughts Peter suggests that ‘visions of utopia do matter’ 
because without them ‘it is difficult to believe that cities would look like they do now’ 
(Hall, 1983:191). However, he makes a distinction between those visionaries ‘who were 
good at understanding what was happening in the world ahead of ordinary mortals and 
harnessing these trends’ and those who just let their ‘fancies rove’ (ibid). The first group 
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often succeeded in the realisation of their visions and left their mark on the urban 
landscape, for better or for worse, while the second group ‘passed into limbo’ (ibid). This 
may explain why we still see the landscapes of Howard, of Le Corbusier, and of Wright, 
but not the imprints of, for example, Soleri’s Arcology (architectural ecology of self-
sustaining mega-structures) or Doxiadis’ Ecumenapolis (one giant world city where 
everyone lives)iii.  The same applies to the contemporary urban labs and Transition 
Towns because they are taking place on blank canvases and in isolation from the 
complexities of the urban relations. Even worse are the rhetoric-laden contemporary 
plans and their hollow promises of creating ‘the most liveable’, ‘the most competitive, 
knowledge-economy’ or ‘the most sustainable’ city. None of these are likely to offer a 
realistic vision of urban futures because they miss a key ingredient. This, in Peter’s 
words, is ‘a strong sense of the art of possible’ and a ‘powerful appreciation of the socio-
economic framework’ (Hall, 1983:194).  He argues that, ‘the story of planning is littered 
with the ruins of utopias that ignored this golden rule’. Furthermore, he reminds us that 
‘planning needs ideas’ but it also needs the ‘machinery’ (Hall, 1972:184) to turn those 
ideas into practice.   
 
Peter’s own futurist perspectives are often grounded in observable trends and an 
appreciation of the context. They are often the projection of the present into the future 
rather than the portrayal of radically different futures in a distant time. This to some 
extent is the manifestation of his belief in empirical research and rootedness in evidence-
base planning which at times is translated into systems based planning. However, 
keeping his feet on the ground is by no means an indication of a lack of long term 
visions. On the contrary, some of his writings present great leaps of imagination with, 
sometimes, an uncanny accuracy about the things to come. His most futuristic visions 
are often those related to technological advances even in social matters, as shown in the 
following excerpt from a 1987 article called Britain 2013. Having seemingly lost his hope 
in the conventional methods of education and training, Peter puts his faith in the hands 
of ‘technical fixes’ to resolve the problem of enduring poverty and exclusion. 
We will have ‘personal microphones inside our head’ (to wake us up). ‘Brain 
enhancers’ from ‘the local garage’ (for the time being we have to do with Omega3 
tablets from the pharmacy). ‘People live where they like’ (only those who can 
exercise choice) and ‘commute a couple of times a week by maglev train’ (some 
do commute but not at a speed of 250 miles per hour). ‘Fares on maglev have 
been slashed.’ (£200+, Newcastle to London, same old trains).  By 2038, 
‘another generation of biodrugs and brain enhancers has either dulled the 
underclass into submission, or transformed them, too, into superpersons.’ (Hall, 
1987: 39-41; The words in brackets are added) 
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The politics of preferable 
Peter’s emphasis on the ‘art of possible’ is a reference to Alvin Toffler’s famous trio. He 
suggests that, effective futurism calls for three ingredients: the science of determining 
the probable future, the art of delineating the possible futures, and the politics of 
defining the preferable futures (Toffler, 1970). Therefore, we need to complement 
Peter’s golden rule with a third Tofflerian ingredient: the politics of preferable. We also 
need to paraphrase Peter’s statement and add that the story of planning is littered with 
the ruins of utopias which were demolished by the vested interest of powerful players. 
Questions of who decides which alternative futures are preferable and for whom were 
less of a concern for some of the early visionaries. Implicitly, however, their visions 
reflected and reinforced the prevailing socio-economic system of their time and its 
politics of preferable. This may explains why in Peter’s words:   
 
‘Corbusian landscapes are typical of centralised regimes where the state provides 
for citizens […]. Wrightian landscapes […] are typical of free enterprise, owner-
occupier societies […].  Howardian landscapes are more typical of mixed 
economies with social democratic governments’ (Hall, 1983: 191).       
 
In ‘a highly speculative paper’ which tries to ‘forecast the quality of life in urban Europe’ 
(Hall, 1973: 5) Peter suggests ‘in co-operation with the public, the forecaster helps to 
shape the future’ (ibid). The role of the public, however, is not to take part in shaping 
the future but to respond to the alternative futures produced by the forecaster.   
Contemporary spatial visioning activities are required to involve the public through 
deliberative processes in the horizon scanning and scenario building processes. Although 
such fairer processes do not necessarily lead to fairer outcomes, without them there is a 
danger that the ends justify any means. In his early works on urban futures Peter has 
focused mainly on the outcome rather than on the process. Even in his later work when 
for the first time governance is discussed his emphasis remains on the outcome. For 
example, in a diagram which depicts ‘good governance’ as ‘an all-embracing concept’, 
‘good’ is defined mainly by government’s objectives such as: sustainable urban 
economy, urban shelter, urban access, urban society, and urban life) and not by 
government’s attributes such as: justice, fairness, transparency, legitimacy and 
accountability. The only exception is ‘urban democracy’ (Hall and Pfeifer, 2000b: 165).     
 
 




There are seven papers and a book which explicitly deal with urban futurism. Two are 
published in early 1970s (some written in the late 1960s), two in the 1980s, and the rest 
at the turn of the 21st century. I will elaborate on these in turn because chronology 
matters. What we see on the horizon often depends on our vantage point.  Hall’s visions 
of urban futures are often the products of their time. They are influenced by: historic 
circumstances, socio-economic contexts, his personal experience of visiting other 
countriesiv and being exposed to influential ideas of his contemporaries, as well as his 
generally optimistic perspective and Fabian (libertarian-left) view of the world.  The 
themes that frequently run through the papers also demonstrate Peter’s interest in 
demography, urban form, transportation, technology and economy.   
 
The celebrated 1960s 
Peter’s early 1970’s visions of urban future are upbeat and optimistic reflecting a pre-
recession time in British urban history characterised by the booming economy; post-war 
political consensus; growing population, car ownership and consumption; full 
employment; immense optimism; and, great confidence in the ability of the state and 
the looming planning legislation (the 1968 Act) to build ‘the planned conurbations’ (Hall, 
1972: 191) of the future. So, not only the context was promising, but also the new 
‘machinery of planning’ (ibid: 184) was about to change planners’ obsession with the 
‘traditional, static, rather immobile world’ of the 1947 (ibid: 185).  There was, however, 
a nagging obstacle: the absence of solid evidence base. Indeed, a recurring source of 
disappointment for Peter was British government’s lack of investment in urban research.  
He argued that, ‘if American planning suffers from a plethora research and no action, 
British Planning suffers from a surfeit of physical plans based on inadequate research 
data’ (ibid: 184).  This was true of the British planning academy as a whole. While by 
the early 1970s the American planning schools had embraced research and scholarship, 
their British counterparts were seriously lagging behind (Davoudi and Pendelbury, 2010). 
The following observation by an American academic in the 1950s was still largely true in 
the early 1970s:  
 
‘The (British) planner was taught to think physically, visually, technically. He still 
does. He was only crudely familiar, if at all, with the nature and use of research 
and scientific method. He knew little of the thinking or the applicability of social 
sciences.’ (Rodwin, 1953 quoted in Davoudi and Pendelbury, 2010: 622) 
 
Reacting to the ‘old rigid master land use plans’ (Hall, 1971: 179) of the 1947 Act and 
demonstrating  his liberal views, Peter suggested that ‘People –even members of the 
same family- can no longer be pigeon-holed so neatly’ (Hall, 1972:192). He celebrated 
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the rising automobile-driven mobility which created spatial freedom so that people could 
choose where they wanted to live. People ‘could have the choice of opting for what they 
most valued: nearness to transport (but higher densities), more garden space (but 
dependence on the car)’ (ibid: 192). For this to happen, he argued that planners must 
make an ‘intellectual jump’: ‘instead of cordons sanitaires of agricultural land many miles 
wide […]’ they should set ‘the pieces of […] new conurbations within a continuous 
country park’; and ‘think of active conversion of ploughland to high density recreational 
use’ (ibid: 192).  This is an early indication of Peter’s view on urban-rural relationship 
which has since continued to be more akin to Howardian attempt to combine the best of 
the town with the best the country, rather than Abercrombie’s insistence that ‘there 
should be no attempt at fusion between the two . . . town should be town and country 
should be country; urban and rural can never be interchangeable adjectives’ 
(Abercrombie, 1933: 177). For Peter, however, ‘any solution […] which abolishes the 
absurd division in planning between town and country, is the right solution’ (Hall, 1971: 
178).  
 
The troubled 1980s 
Peter’s 1980s’ visions of Britain’s urban future are set in a very different context from 
the previous decades. The economy is in recession, the country is being de-
industrialised, large cities are losing population, unemployment is rising, riots are 
recurring scenes and symptomatic of inner city decline and social problems, the mixed-
economy consensus is slipping away, and the New Right philosophy of privatisation, de-
regulation, shrunk welfare state and great suspicion of strategic planning is gathering 
pace. In short, Thatcherism is reigning.  
  
In the two papers written at that time, Peter turns his attention to a future which was 
sufficiently distant from the troubled 1980s so that a beam of light could shine on the 
darkness of the immediate future. The first paper is a short article in Geographical 
Magazine (Hall, 1985) and focuses almost entirely on technology. It draws on 
Kondratieff’s long wave and Schumpeter’s creative destruction cycles of capitalism and 
links these to the new geographies of innovation.  The paper reveals one of Peter’s long 
standing professional and personal concerns: the problem of north-south divide in 
England. Persistent regional disparities have preoccupied Peter since his childhood 
emotionally, analytically and normatively.  As he often reminds us in his writings and 
personal communications, research, including Peter’s own, is yet to find satisfactory 




The second paper is an article in New Society (Hall, 1987). It draws a much broader 
picture of the future and speculates about a wider range of issues including: economy, 
technology, lifestyle, politics (with capital P), and society. Here, Peter leaves out his 
passion for facts and figures about demography, density, transportation and urban forms 
and lets his imagination fly. The result is a brilliant piece of futurist thinking that is 
beautifully crafted, vividly imagined, and powerfully articulated.  Peter portrays the 
future with uncanny accuracy, as shown in the following excerpt. The only thing he gets 
wrong is the timing. He presents an image of the Britain of 2005 rather than the Britain 
of 2013, as the tile of the article suggests.   
 
‘It is a grey Great Britain of 2013.’ ‘The good news is that economy is again 
booming.’ ‘Space mining and manufacturing’ are happening. There is a ‘New 
Democratic Alliance under Kinnock and Steel’. ‘Sales of […] the nominal 
membership of the House of Lords […] provides useful government revenue’. ‘We 
sell creativity to the world. Our genius lies in doing daft things’. ‘.. more people 
choose to live in small villages at increasing distance from the cities.’ ‘It’s a good 
life.’ But, ‘there’s the rub: […] 30% of us are unemployed.’ ‘The underclass has 
segregated itself into racial and cultural ghettos.’ (Hall, 1987: 39-41)  
 
With his typical optimism, great sense of hummer and poetic prose, Peter concludes the 
article with the images of an even more distant future stating that, 
  
‘The futurologists are busy predicting the Britain of 2038; a Britain more than one 
third richer, thanks to the boom of 2020s […] the Britain of the orgiastic future, in 
which unbridled hedonism and saturnalia again reign’ (Hall, 1987: 41).  
 
From the 2013 vantage point it is difficult to see such a reassuring horizon at a time 
when Britain, like the rest of the western world, is: experiencing a deep recession, faced 
with rising social problems, and threatened by calamities of climate change. The early 
2000s’ party is over and it is time to pay for its social and environmental costs in the 
hope that the Britain of 2038 is a celebration of prosperity and wellbeing and not 
unfettered growth and hedonistic consumption.     
  
The first urban century  
Peter Hall’s most substantive work on urban futures is his 363 pages-long book: Urban 
Future 21 (Hall and Pfeifer, 2000a), which came out of the work undertaken over two 
years by a group of international experts (called the World Commission URBAN 21) and 
the Expert Group. The Commission was appointed by the German Federal Government 
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and moderated by Sir Peter Hall who, together with Ulrich Pfeifer of the Emperica 
Research Institute, provided an extensive background report to which individual experts, 
including Peter himself, contributed (BBR, 1999).  The Commission’s World Report (Hall 
and Pfeifer, 2000b) was submitted to the Global Conference on the Urban Future URBAN 
21 (held in Berlin in July 2000 in the framework of the EXPO 2000 World Exhibition) and 
then published in a book format.   
 
Urban Future 21 has four characteristics which make it distinct from Peter’s earlier 
futures work: firstly, the book follows a more systematic approach to futurism and draws 
explicitly on scenario building techniques that had only been used by Peter previously in 
his Europe 2000s project (Hall, 1973). Secondly, it covers a wider geographical scale 
looking beyond Britain, Europev and North America and into the rapidly urbanising world 
of developing countries, notably the Pearl River Delta in Asia Pacific. Other regions of 
global south such as Africa and Middle East, however, remained outside his horizon. 
Thirdly, it deals with a broader thematic scope including not only Peter’s longstanding 
interest in changes in demography, economy, technology, transport and urban form, but 
also new themes of sustainability and governance.  Almost half of the book is dedicated 
to the latter, representing the fourth distinct feature of this work. For the first time, 
Peter explicitly combines future speculation with policy guidance, and futurology with 
good practice.  
 
The work on the Book started in the late 1990s when many countries were recovering 
from the 1980s’ sharp downturn in the global economy which was by then characterised 
as informational economy. The use of personal computers and telecommunication was 
widespread, the developing countries were rapidly urbanising and the emerging 
economies of countries such as China and India were becoming key players in the 
world’s stage.  The footprints of all these can be traced in Urban Future 21.  More 
significantly, the book is influenced by two landmark events in the 1990s: one was the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist regime; the other was the 
publication of the Brundtland Report by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED, 1987).  The former led to a growing claim about ‘the end of 
history’ and ideology (Fukuyama, 1992) and the triumph of the free market over socialist 
alternatives. The latter advocated a positive sum ‘ecological modernisation’ as a way 
forward for addressing unsustainable practices (Davoudi, 2012a). 
 
Both seem to have reinforced Peter’s and his co-author’s pragmatic (some might say 
conservative) recommendations.  One of their key messages is that, ‘… planning 
regulations tend to work best when they are consistent with market behaviour’ (Hall and 
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Pfeifer, 2000b:289). Elsewhere, Peter also advises planners not to work against 
individual preferences and behaviours because he believes that, ‘a moral imperative is 
no imperative at all unless it is accompanied by real imperatives, meaning physical or 
financial constraints’ (Hall, 1997: 285 original emphasis).  On the environmental issues, 
the position of Urban Future 21 which follows Brundtland’s is surprising because in a 
paper written in the 1990s, Peter acknowledges that environmental considerations 
cannot be dealt with without contestation.  In fact, he argues that they are ‘replacing the 
traditional lines of political cleavages between capital and labour’, adding that, ‘the new 
lines of divisions are between wealth creation … and environmental conservation’ (Hall, 
1995:268 original emphasis); i.e. far from a win-win solution that is advocated by 
various shades of ‘weak’ sustainability.   
 
Following a typical scenario building approach, the book firstly sets out the basic driving 
forces that would create opportunities and constraints for the world’s city dwellers. It 
then presents two scenarios for 2025: the first one is ‘Business as Usual’, asking what 
cities will look like if the current trends continue unchecked. The second one is an 
alternative scenario based on ‘Bending the Trends’ and asking how the cities can change 
for the better if they act to change the trends. The Book then sets out a number of 
principles that can guide the cities in their attempt to achieve the above, proposing two 
key principles: sustainable urban development as key policy objective and decentralised 
local empowerment as the means of delivery.  The last chapter of the book applies these 
principles in an action plan for the world cities (ibid: pp39-40).   
 
4. Future of ‘the city’ 
 
The preceding section dealt with Peter’s work on the cities in the future. In this section, I 
discuss his work on the future of ‘the city’ as a phenomenon.  Peter engages with this in 
four articles (Hall, 1984a; 1984b; 1999; 2003) that followed his keynote address in the 
First National Conference of Building Science Forum of Australia (Hall, 1982).  The latest 
one has the most provocative title: The end of the city? ‘The report of my death was an 
exaggeration’ (Hall, 2003).  They are all motivated by the then emerging claim about the 
end of cities. This was a time when researchers, particularly in America, were predicting 
a world of frictionless plain where people and businesses would be free to locate 
anywhere they wished; a time when geography did not matter; a time when 
telecommunication and marginal transaction cost would lead to ‘the death of distance’.  
In his keynote address, Peter concentrates on population growth and decline in cities and 
presents a five-stage schema model of urban evolution, showing ‘how, and why, the 
problems of urban areas in the developing countries are the precise reverse of those in 
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the developed lands’ (Hall, 1982:9).  He warns the delegate about ‘a set of paradoxes’ to 
come: continuing programmes of construction in the suburbs and the under-use of 
infrastructure and buildings ‘in hearts of the cities’ in advanced industrial cities (ibid). His 
most alarming message relates to developing countries where ‘the new monster cities 
tend to sprawl’ (ibid: 10) producing ‘a growth of cities of poor people’ (ibid: 6). 
Reflecting on the recession of the 1980s, Peter seems to call for the second wave of 
utopias that I mentioned in section two above. He suggests that, 
 
 ‘…the continuing urbanisation of the less developed world should now be 
engaging our earnest attention and our best abilities. For if we do not heed, the 
consequences – in social, human and finally political terms- could be dire.’ (Hall, 
1982: 11)     
 
In the other papers, Peter responds to the claim about ‘death of distance’ by stressing 
the continuing and even increasing need for face-to-face contacts, despite or maybe 
because of telecommunications.  In his typical sense of hummer he stresses that, 
‘Anecdotally, this paper was produced at home with the new technology, then put me on 
a 5000-mile journey to a conference in Vancouver’ (Hall, 1984b:349).  His point is that 
agglomeration forces continue to be relevant as ‘the urban glue’ (Hall, 2003: 142); that 
cities have a future; a point also made in a 1999 paper on the Future Planning of City 
Region and in response to Melvin Webber’s ‘non-place urban realm’. He stressed that, no 
matter how much people interact in the cyberspace they still ‘identify with a particular 
place on the earth’s surface’ (Hall, 1999:68).  Having confirmed that cities have a future, 
he advises against complacency and argues that, ‘without positive intervention, British 
cities will continue to decline and perhaps even wither’ (Hall, 1984a: 78).  That is why he 
calls for ‘imaginative efforts’, the likes of which he had witnessed in ‘a quick tour of six 
German cities’. Efforts such as: ‘high quality public transport’, pedestrianisation of city 
centres on an epic scale’, and ‘banishing’ of ‘car to all intents and purposes’ are 
mentioned as exemplars of what we now call ‘place making’ efforts. These are the kind 
of practices that British cities began to do in the 1990s and are now in danger of being 
retreated. As public expenditure falls, so does the quality of places! 
 
One point is worth mentioning here. Peter’s engagement with the future of ‘the city’ is 
based largely on the modernist conception of the city as a physical container of 
population and functions rather than a relational view of the city as socially constructed 
and dependent on the social and cultural processes and substances that make it up (Davoudi and 
Strange, 2009; Davoudi, 2012b).  So, in addressing the Australian delegates Peter urges 
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that, ‘the most basic and important questions you can ask about cities’ relate to things 
that can be measured notably, ‘the degree of urbanisation; the primacy index; and the 
extent of suburban decentralisation’ (Hall, 1982: 8, original emphasis). There are, 
however, alternative conceptions of ‘the city’. For example, some follow Shakespeare’s 
idea that ‘the people are the city’; that cities are expression of human spirit and 
ingenuity. Others consider the ‘polis’ as a social institution and a self-governing 
community, and a third group see cities as civilisation. The city as plural phenomena is 
all of this; it is simultaneously the conceived space of imagination, the perceived space 
of representation and the lived space of everyday practices (after Lefebvre, 1991).  
          
5. The future? 
    
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that the current foresight activities are markedly 
different from the early visionary idealism as many are motivated by imagining and 
creating the carbon-neutral urban futures. There is another more profound difference 
between the way in which time and future were understood then and the way they are 
understood today. The utopian visions of the early 20th century were largely based on 
the modernist over-confidence in the ability of Reason to pave the future and put 
societies on a linear path to progress (Davoudi, 2012b). Future was considered as an 
‘open future’ (Leccardi, 2008) capable of being controlled through human choices and 
decisions that are made at present.  This is now seen as over-ambitious and even 
misguided because scientific, technical and modelling advances- significant as they are- 
cannot eliminate risks and uncertainties. As Unger (2007) suggests, it is the ubiquity of 
change and its potential for novelty and surprise that characterise the concept of future 
time. This changing perception of the future reflects a paradigm shift in how scientists 
think about the world. Rather than seeing the world as orderly, mechanical and 
reasonably predictable, they see it as chaotic, complex, uncertain, and inherently 
unpredictable. The idea is that regime shifts are not necessarily the outcome of an 
external shock and its linear and proportional cause and effects. They can also happen 
because of internal stresses with no proportional or linear relationship between the cause 
and the effect. That, small scale changes can amplify and cascade into major shifts, 
while large interventions may have little or no effects. An alarming example of such 
complexity and feedbacks is the warming of the Arctic which is happening twice as fast 
as the rest of the planet (The Economist, 2012).   
 
For urban futurists the message is that, ‘past behaviour of the system is no longer a 
reliable predictor of future behaviour even when circumstances are similar’ (Duit et al, 
2010:367). In Peter’s words, ‘The world’s great cities have fooled us before and will 
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doubtless do so again in the future’ (Hall, 1984c: 350). What does all this mean for 
planners’ conventional ‘toolkits’ which are based on forecasting the future by 
extrapolating past trends? Does it mean that in a world defined by a state of flux 
‘planning is condemned to solve yesterday’s problems’ (Taylor, 2005:157)?  This may 
well be the case unless planners relax their traditional obsession with fixity, order and 
control, and allow for more flexibility and adaptability. This requires ‘assuming change 
and explaining stability, instead of assuming stability and explaining change’ (Folke et al 
2010:352).   
One of the lessons of the evolutionary- as opposed to engineering or ecological- 
resilience (see Davoudi, 2012c for definitions) for planning is that uncertainty carries the 
seeds of innovation and transformation. This means that ‘successful planning’ can turn a 
crisis into an opportunity if it uses what Peter calls ‘utopia plus social realism’ (Hall, 
1987:192). If such opportunities are to be captured in the interest of the society at large 
rather than a minority of interests, then planners need to add to the mix a big dose of 
social justice which often requires challenging the status quo.  Finally, we may not be 
able to predict the future but nothing stops us from imagining the future.  Similarly, we 
may not be able to control the future but nothing stops us from carving out opportunities 
from past memories, present experiences and future aspirations all linked together not in 
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i As depicted on the cover of Cities of Tomorrow; a report published by the European Commission, Directorate 
General for Regional Policy in October 2011 with contributions from Peter Hall  
ii http://www.environmentteam.com/2010/08/31/pictures-of-futuristic-cities/ 
iii
 It should be mentioned that Soleri’s Arcology has a cult-like following and is being slowly materialised in 
Arcosanti in the Arizona desert and is proposed for Shimizu Pyramid City in Tokyo Bay. Also while Doxiadis’ 
prophecy that one day we would all live in one giant world city proved to be more of a poetic vision, it does 
resonate with some contemporary realities, if we look at areas such as East Asia, where Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo 
(BeSeTo) urban corridor transcends national boundaries stretching, almost contiguously, along a 1500 
kilometre strip of densely populated (98 million inhabitants) land within a maximum air travelling time of 90 
minutes (Davoudi, 2003)  
iv
 Peter Hall visited for the first time Sweden in 1965, the United States in 1966 and Hong Kong in 1975 
(Personal communication, Peter Hall Symposium, UCL, June 2012) 
v
 Peter engaged with the future of European cities substantially in his 1970s’ work on Europe 2000 which is the 
subject of another chapter in this volume and hence not mentioned in this chapter. 
